Uncovering Systemic Discrimination: Allowing Individual Challenges to a  Pattern or Practice by Tsang, Christine
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Uncovering Systemic Discrimination:
Allowing Individual Challenges to a "Pattern or Practice"
Christine Tsang*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,> the workplace remains a
site of wide racial and gender disparities. Many employees today claim to experi-
ence more subtle forms of discrimination associated with informal systems of
promotion, mentorship, and evaluation. Largely undocumented or uncon-
scious,' these "tap on the shoulder"' practices suggest more than the exceptional
* The author would like to extend special thanks to Professor Christine Jolls and
David Louk for their insights and suggestions on an earlier version of this
Comment, as well as to James Anglin Flynn and his colleagues at the Yale Law &
Policy Review for their thoughtful feedback during the editing process. She is also
grateful to Linda Evarts, Chris Lapinig, and Shayak Sarkar for their support and
encouragement.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28,
and 42 U.S.C. (20o6)) (prohibiting discrimination by employers on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
2. The shifting nature of discrimination has been well documented by scholars. Al-
most two decades ago, Linda Hamilton Krieger wrote on the increasingly subtle
forms of discrimination, often finding individuals unaware of the discriminatory
character of their own decisions. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Cat-
egories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); see Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 749-50 (2005); Christine Jolls &
Cass Sunstein, The Law ofImplicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006).
3. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, plaintiffs entered evidence indicating that Wal-
Mart managers were not required to announce new job openings or training op-
portunities. Instead, the managers could "tap on the shoulder" of their favorite em-
ployees, who were disproportionately male. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 1562-64 (2011) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that although
women at Wal-Mart filled "70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer's stores,"
they made up only "33 percent of management employees." Id. at 2563. But see Rich-
ard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age ofAggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 155 (2009) (suggesting that Wal-Mart's employment statistics are not unusual
when compared to the economy at large).
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instance of individual discrimination; they point to persistent, system-wide vio-
lations of Title VII and biased employment decisions stemming from "excessive
subjectivity." 4
Plaintiffs seeking relief have challenged these employment practices under
Title VII, often pointing to a "pattern or practice" of discrimination-what is
commonly referred to as systemic disparate treatment or systemic discrimina-
tion.5 The pattern or practice claim has been described as "the most potent and
least understood of the various Title VII causes of action."' Even with recent ac-
ademic efforts to fill this gap,7 it is an area of antidiscrimination law that remains
surprisingly undertheorized.
Proving systemic disparate treatment requires plaintiffs to overcome com-
plex procedural and evidentiary hurdles.' Some scholars have noted that pattern
or practice claims are "invariably class actions" and often fail in the process of
seeking class certification.9 Others suggest that the Supreme Court's decision to
decertify the plaintiff class in Wal-Mart v. Dukes has "called into question the
future of systemic disparate treatment law."o Yet these concerns appear to over-
look the more fundamental question of who has access to the pattern or practice
claim: do individual complainants have a cause of action in the absence of a cer-
tified class? Although an answer in the affirmative would have obvious implica-
tions for the continuing vitality of these claims, many courts and commentators
4. Hart, supra note 2, at 767.
5. Some commentators warn against too close an association between "pattern or
practice discrimination" and system-wide discrimination. Maurice Munroe sug-
gests that "the term 'pattern or practice' is more flexible than [system-wide] and
covers any discrimination which is more than an isolated or infrequent occur-
rence." Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 228 n.48 (1995). Other commentators have added that in ad-
dressing systemic harm, "courts have too often remained focused on the individual
wrongs that are data points in the overarching story of structural injury." Melissa
Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 456 (2011).
6. Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 477, 478 (2011).
7. See Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387 (2011).
8. For example, plaintiffs often struggle to obtain the direct or circumstantial evidence
necessary for proving such claims. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) (discussing the courts' reliance on "compara-
tors" in evaluating discrimination claims).
9. Selmi, supra note 6, at 478-79. Michael Selmi notes that the pattern or practice case
law has emerged primarily in the context of class certification. Id. at 479 n.6.
10. Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J.




have simply assumed without further discussion that systemic disparate treat-
ment is inherently a class action matter." Though the Supreme Court has re-
mained silent on the issue, circuit courts have similarly denied non-class pattern
or practice suits.
This Comment argues that limiting the pattern or practice claim to certified
class actions is historically and theoretically unsupported. Part I provides a brief
overview of the origins and evolution of the pattern or practice cause of action.
Part II considers judicial efforts to address the availability of individual pattern
or practice claims and the arguments made in the leading circuit court decisions.
Finally, in Part III, I argue that the history of the pattern or practice framework
and a theory of discrimination based on the source of harm, rather than number
of plaintiffs, favor the recognition of a pattern or practice claim for individual
litigants.
I. THE HISTORY OF A "PATTERN OR PRACTICE"
The pattern or practice cause of action was not a creation of Congress. It
emerged from the courts' attempt to create workable standards and evidentiary
requirements for challenges against systemic discrimination. With limited statu-
tory roots, most guidance on the structure and interpretation of these claims
stems from two foundational 1977 Supreme Court cases. Michael Selmi notes that
"[i]n no other area of substantive antidiscrimination case law-indeed, perhaps
no other area of law-are the leading cases three decades old.""
The original pattern or practice claim appeared in response to the significant
public harm of systemic discrimination cognized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The phrase "pattern or practice" appears in only one part of Title VII. Section
707 authorizes government action "against an employer 'engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by' the
statute."" The original grant of authority to bring a section 707 action belonged
exclusively to the Attorney General and was later delegated to the EEOC.'4 Both
ni. Some courts recognize as "settled law" the fact that pattern-or-practice claims
"either may be brought by the EEOC if there is 'reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice' of discrimination,
42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-6(a) (1994); . .. or by a class of private plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C.
§ 200oe." EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (ith Cir. 2000); see
infra Part II (discussing the availability of an individual pattern or practice claim in
the circuit courts).
12. Selmi, supra note 6, at 478.
13. Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 20ooe-6 (2006)).
14. 110 CONG. REC. 12,722 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) ("[T]he Attorney Gen-
eral is authorized by section 707 to institute suit whenever he has reasonable cause
to believe that there is a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of title
VII."); see EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002) ("When Title VII
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the statutory text and early history of section 707 suggest that Congress intended
to create a broad public enforcement authority to prosecute systemic discrimi-
nation unencumbered by administrative or procedural requirements.15 Indeed,
neither Congress nor the courts attempted at any point to impose a Rule 23 re-
quirement on the enforcement actions of the Attorney General or EEOC.16
In the 1973 case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'7 the Court provided a
method of proof for assessing individual disparate treatment claims that emerged
as the dominant standard. In phase one under McDonnell Douglas, a prima facie
case of discrimination can be established by showing that: (1) a plaintiff belongs
to a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the job he was working or
seeking; (3) the plaintiff was terminated or rejected; and (4) the position re-
mained open or was filled by someone with similar qualifications.' 9 Although
McDonnell Douglas allowed plaintiffs to enter statistical evidence, it was consid-
ered merely a probative factor within the four-part test. More recently, many
scholars have criticized the McDonnell Douglas framework as being "ill suited to
was enacted in 1964, it authorized private actions by individual employees and pub-
lic actions by the Attorney General in cases involving a 'pattern or practice' of dis-
crimination." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-6(a) (1994))). The Senate failed to pass
an amendment to the original language of Title VII limiting the power of the Com-
missioner, "recognizing that it was necessary to combat discrimination even when
individual victims did not take the initiative." Munroe, supra note 5, at 250.
15. Munroe, supra note 5, at 249 ("The Attorney General was not required to follow
any administrative procedures prior to suit because Congress originally devised
pattern or practice suits to allow swift federal prosecution of particularly harmful
practices.").
16. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 327 (1980) ("In [no suit] was
it ever suggested that the Attorney General sued in a representative capacity or that
his enforcement suit must comply with the requirements of Rule 23."). Still, the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments indicates that Congress was aware of a
connection between pattern or practice discrimination and class action lawsuits,
noting that Title VII claims "involve the vindication of a major public interest, and
that any action under the Act involves considerations beyond those raised by the
individual claimant. As a consequence, the leading cases in this area to date have
recognized that many Title VII claims are necessarily class action complaints." 118
CONG. REC. 4942 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams); see also 118 CONG. REC. 4080
(1972) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (describing section 707 actions as "in the nature
of class actions").
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. Krieger, supra note 2, at 1163 (noting that "well over 90 percent of all Title VII cases"
proceed "under the 'disparate treatment' theory of discrimination first established
in McDonnell Douglas").




addressing the subtle types of discrimination .. . most common in the modern
workplace."2 0
Four years later, the burden-shifting framework now commonly associated
with pattern or practice claims was operationalized by the Supreme Court in two
companion cases." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States in-
volved a civil action brought by the government against a motor freight company
for subjecting African-American and Latino employees to a pattern or practice
of discrimination. The Teamsters Court created a two-phase method of proof that
differed from McDonnell Douglas in three important respects: first, it held that
statistical evidence could be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of systemic
discrimination;" second, it awarded a presumption of individual discrimination
after finding a pattern or practice of workplace discrimination; and third, it al-
lowed a court to grant prospective relief before reaching the question of individ-
ual discrimination." In so doing, the Court appeared to recognize the tools for
proving systemic discrimination as necessarily different from those for individu-
alized harm. 4
The two phases of the Teamsters framework-liability and remedy-guide
courts in determining whether a plaintiff has shown a company's discriminatory
behavior to be "standard operating procedure." 5 In the liability phase, plaintiffs
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by producing statistical evi-
dence and anecdotal testimony showing that an employer engaged in a pattern
or practice of discrimination based on a protected trait." Where a gross disparity
20. Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 112
(2007) (citing literature critical of the McDonnell Douglas framework).
21. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
22. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337-40. The Teamsters Court did acknowledge that "this was
not a case in which the Government relied on 'statistics alone"' and that the testi-
monies of around forty employees "brought the cold numbers convincingly to life,"
though the opinion did not discuss the testimony in any detail. Id. at 339. Some
scholars have argued that the individual testimony provided appeared to be neither
essential nor dispositive. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 6, at 485 (noting that the early
pattern or practice cases "relied almost entirely on statistics to prove intent").
23. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360-62.
24. See id. at 358 (noting that McDonnell Douglas "did not purport to create an inflexi-
ble formulation" for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination).
25. Id. at 336.
26. The Teamsters Court was persuaded by statistical evidence showing African-Amer-
ican and Latino employees to be limited to the lowest paying jobs at the company.
Id. at 337-38. Approximately 80% of the African-American and Latino workers held
lower-paying jobs in operations and servicemen positions, as compared to approx-
imately 40% of the white employees. Although the company workforce was about
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exists, statistical evidence alone may be sufficient." The burden then shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence explaining "why the observed pattern was not the
product of discrimination."" To show that a plaintiffs claims are "inaccurate or
insignificant,"2 9 a defendant will try to impugn the "source, accuracy, or proba-
tive force" of the evidence offered by the plaintiff or present his own statistical
and anecdotal evidence.3 0 If the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the
trier of fact must then determine whether the plaintiff has shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the employer participated in a pattern or practice of
intentional discrimination." Otherwise, plaintiffs receive a presumption of dis-
crimination. Even absent any proof of harm to specific employees, a successful
phase one liability determination justifies an award of prospective relief. This
might include, for instance, "an injunctive order against continuation of the dis-
criminatory practice, an order that the employer keep records of its future em-
ployment decisions and file periodic reports with the court, or any other order
'necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights' protected by Title VII."
In the remedial stage, plaintiffs seeking individual relief, such as reinstate-
ment or back pay,33 must demonstrate that they were victims of the discrimina-
9% African-American and Latino, less than 1% of all line drivers were African-Amer-
ican and Latino. All of the African-American line drivers, with only one exception,
were hired after litigation had commenced. Id.
27. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) ("There is
no doubt that '[wihere gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a
proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion' under Title VII." (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
307-o8 (1977))). Courts have emphasized, however, that statistics are not "irrefuta-
ble" and "maybe rebutted." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340,
28. Selmi, supra note 6, at 483.
29. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
30. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A defendant may, for example, claim that individuals
lacked the necessary qualifications for higher-paid positions or were not interested
in applying. E.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 322 (7th Cir. 1988)
(affirming the district court's acceptance of the claim that women were not inter-
ested in commissioned positions).
31. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.7 (2011) (holding that
establishing a pattern or practice will justify equitable relief against discriminatory
behavior).
32. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
33. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560-61 ("When the plaintiff seeks individual relief such as
reinstatement or backpay after establishing a pattern or practice of discrimination,
'a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings ... to determine the




tion established in the liability stage and that they suffered an adverse employ-
ment decision. 4 Each individual plaintiff benefits from the presumption "that
any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discrimina-
tory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy."', The defendant has
the burden to raise affirmative defenses and offer lawful reasons for its employ-
ment decision." In turn, the plaintiffs must assert the company's nondiscrimina-
tory justifications were merely "a pretext for unlawful discrimination."" A plain-
tiff becomes entitled to individualized relief if the employer fails to meet its
burden or if, based on the arguments offered by both sides, the plaintiff success-
fully proves his claim of discrimination.
Though Teamsters was a government-initiated claim, lower courts quickly
came to apply the burden-shifting framework to both public and private ac-
tions." The application of the Teamsters framework to private class actions ap-
peared uncontroversial to lower courts. 9 By contrast, private non-class litigants
34. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-62.
35. Id. at 361; see Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.7 (finding that a pattern or practice of
discrimination "will support a rebuttable inference that all class members were vic-
tims of the discriminatory practice"). Some courts have noted that this "substan-
tially lessen [s] each class member's evidentiary burden relative to . . . an individual
disparate treatment claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework." Robinson, 267
F.3d at 159.
36. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362); see Hart, supra note
5, at 460 (suggesting that the Wal-Mart Court read "the flexibility out of Teamsters"
and "reframe [d]" the decision).
37. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362 n.50 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 804-o6 (1973)).
38. See, e.g., Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1034 (W.D. Va. 1979)
("[I]n a class action, plaintiffs make out a prima facie case when they prove a dis-
criminatory pattern and practice."); Presseisen v. Swarthmore CoIll, 442 F. Supp.
593, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that the terms "pattern or practice" when used in
a private class action reflect their usual meaning). Cases decided in 1977 by district
and appellate courts applied the burden-shifting framework of Teamsters to section
707 claims, as well as to private class actions. A WestLaw search reveals that, in 1977
alone, over 20 opinions considering private class action pattern or practice claims
cited Teamsters.
39. Not one case noted that the Supreme Court had yet to explicitly extend the "pattern
or practice" claim to private class actions. Private class actions before Teamsters
appeared to have brought challenges against the discriminatory policies or practices
of employers, though they may not have used the term "pattern or practice" specif-
ically. In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., for example, a Title VII class action plaintiff
sought an injunction to prohibit the employer "from continuing or maintaining
the policy, practice, custom and usage of denying, abridging, withholding, condi-
tioning, limiting or otherwise interfering with the rights of plaintiff and others sim-
ilarly situated to enjoy equal employment opportunity as secured by Title VII . . .
without discrimination on the basis of race or color." 400 F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1968).
See Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title
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have largely been denied access to the Teamsters method of proof, though the
Court has never affirmatively ratified or disallowed such claims.
II. A MAJORITY OF CIRCUIT COURTS OPPOSE A PRIVATE NON-CLASs RIGHT
A handful of circuit court rulings have considered whether individual plain-
tiffs have access to claims of pattern or practice discrimination. The majority view
allows pattern or practice suits only when brought by a certified class. 4o Two ex-
planations offered by the circuit courts warrant closer consideration. One sug-
gests that the Teamsters framework should be limited to class litigation until the
Supreme Court provides affirmative support for individual claims. Plaintiffs, the
courts argue, should not be able to circumvent the traditional elements of a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case by appeal to the statistical evidence allowed
under Teamsters. The Second Circuit has offered a second and more nuanced
explanation: that the Teamsters burden-shifting framework should be limited to
the class-action context in which it was originally developed.
First, the majority view points out that the Supreme Court has never before
extended Teamsters to an individual, non-class suit. 4' The courts appear to view
the pattern or practice cause of action as an inherently limited one but have pro-
vided little explanation for the suggestion that a non-class suit would require the
express authorization of the Court. In language relied on by other circuits, the
Fourth Circuit found a "'manifest' and 'crucial' difference" between an individ-
ual claim and a class claim in "the nature of the proof and remedies."4N However,
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 934 (1978) ("The develop-
ment of the Title VII class action was critical in the private enforcement efforts.").
40. See, e.g., Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 632 (ioth Cir. 2012); Chin
v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2012); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Con-
sol., 516 F-3d 955, 967-69 & n.24 (iith Cir. 2008); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.,
370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Celestine v. Petroleos de Venez. SA, 266 F.3d 343,
356 & n.4 (Sth Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61
(4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Gilty v. Vill. of Oak
Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7 th Cir. 1990); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465,
467-71 (8th Cir. 1984). But see Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Karp v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting
that " [i]t is by no means obvious that this device should be available to class-action
plaintiffs but not to individual plaintiffs; indeed, the distinction seems arbitrary and
illogical"). See generally David J. Bross, The Use of Pattern-and-Practice by Individ-
uals in Non-Class Claims, 28 NOVA L. REV. 795, 796-97 (2004) (compiling circuit
court opinions addressing the availability of an individual pattern or practice
claim).
41. E.g., Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1095 (ioth Cir. 2001); Cel-
estine, 266 F.3d at 355-56; Lowery, 158 F.3d at 760-61; Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1252; Craik,
731 F.2d at 469-70.




it offered little reasoned basis for this distinction.43 Some courts relied simply on
the "weight of authority" of the other circuits.44
Chief among the concerns of the majority view are the doctrinal inconsist-
encies that may emerge from an individual plaintiff s use of the Teamsters frame-
work in lieu of the traditional McDonnell Douglas standard. Courts have reasoned
that an inference of discrimination has never been awarded until the plaintiff had
proven all prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test (only one of which includes the
use of statistics). Proof of a discriminatory pattern or practice under Teamsters
would allow a plaintiff to circumvent the requirements of a prima facie case by
permitting a plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to an employer without first
making an individualized showing of discrimination. 4
Relatedly, the circuit courts have expressed concern that a non-class pattern
or practice claim would violate more recent jurisprudence on the burden of per-
suasion. In the 1981 case of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
the Supreme Court held that, in the context of private, non-class disparate treat-
ment litigation, "[tihe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff."46 Indeed, under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs bear the burden
of persuasion at all times, though the burden of production might shift to the de-
fendant.47 A burden of production requires a party to produce evidence, while
the burden of persuasion requires "the party to prove to the fact finder the truth
or existence of those facts for which the party has the burden."* The argument
suggests that Teamsters could only have been intended to apply to private class
actions because the burden-shifting framework of Teamsters would allow a plain-
43. For example, the Lowery court stated that class actions began by litigating common
questions of fact and explained that the Teamsters and McDonnell Douglas frame-
works offered different remedies. It appeared not to recognize that an individual
might hope to seek the forms of injunctive relief available to a plaintiff class under
Teamsters. Id.
44. E.g., Bacon, 370 F.3d at 575.
45. Although this evidence "remains relevant in assessing whether the plaintiffs proved
discrimination using the individual disparate treatment and disparate impact
methods of proof," Chin, 685 F.3d at 147, it is nonetheless true that "such proof
cannot relieve the plaintiff of the need to establish each element of his or her claim,"
id. at 149.
46. 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
47. E.g., id. at 253; Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F-3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
48. Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and
Wards Cove: Semantics As Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 620 (1990).
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tiff to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer in violation of this princi-
ple.49 There is some indication, however, that the scope of Burdine should not be
interpreted as applying to a prima facie case established under Teamster."o
Only the Second Circuit offers a more intellectually satisfying justification of
the narrow view of the pattern or practice claim. In Chin v. Port Authority," the
Second Circuit asserted that the Teamsters framework was adopted from an ear-
lier case involving a certified class action, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,"
and should be limited to the class action context from which it was derived. The
court reasoned that Franks used the term "'pattern and practice' to refer to the
common question of fact (whether the employer had engaged in a practice of
discriminatory hiring) to be litigated by class plaintiffs, and apparently viewed its
holding as no more than an application of McDonnell Douglas' burden-shifting
framework in the class-action context."3 Thus, the Franks burden-shifting
framework was intended to apply only to the limited scope of private class actions
and, only by express extension under Teamsters, section 707 government actions.
The Second Circuit therefore held, by appeal to the origins of the claim, that a
non-class pattern or practice suit would require the express authorization of the
Court.
On the other hand, the opinion most often cited in favor of the individual
pattern or practice claim is comparatively underreasoned. In Davis v. Califano,
the D.C. Circuit argued broadly in support of the sufficiency of statistical evi-
dence in proving a prima facie case.54 The Davis court allowed an individual fe-
male employee to bring a suit against gender discrimination in hiring, promo-
tions, and other conditions of employment. It found that statistical evidence-
data showing disparities in the salary structures and promotion rates of male and
female employees-had equal probative weight in an individual case as in a class
49. See Developments in the Law-Shifting Burdens ofProof in Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation, 1o9 HARv. L. REV. 1568, 1579-1602 (1996).
50. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that Burdine "involved the'narrow question' whether, after a plaintiff
had carried the 'not onerous' burden of establishing the prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas, the burden of persuasion should be shifted to the employer to
prove that a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action existed" (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 250, 253)).
51. 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs in Chin were eleven Asian-American police
officers currently or formerly employed by the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey who brought a suit under Title VII based on allegations that they were
passed over for promotions because of their race. Id. at 140. Although the Second
Circuit had never directly addressed this question prior to Chin, it had suggested
that the pattern or practice claim was likely intended exclusively for class actions.
See Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F-3d 706, 711 (2d Cir. 1998).
52. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
53. Chin, 685 F.3d at 148 (citing Franks, 424 U.S. at 773).
54. 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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action. A more recent district court case, affirmed on other grounds by the D.C.
Circuit," throws the status of Davis into question and argues that the case has
been misinterpreted as standing for the proposition that individuals may pursue
a pattern or practice suit.56
Of the three remaining circuits still silent on the issue, courts have either
avoided the question" or provided only slight indication that a non-class pattern
or practice suit might be available."8 The Ninth Circuit has left open the possibil-
ity of individual claims, even as district courts have adopted the reasoning of the
majority view. 59 In Obrey v. Johnson, the Ninth Circuit allowed an individual em-
ployee of a naval shipyard to bring suit against the Secretary of the Navy for dis-
criminatory hiring based on an allegation of a "pattern or practice" of discrimi-
nation, making reference to Teamsters and an evidentiary burden of showing
systemic discrimination."o
55. Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd
on other grounds, 421 Fed. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
56. Rather, the district court reasoned that Davis merely affirmed the ability of statisti-
cal evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination within the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Id. at 6-7 ("We have previously indicated, and now explicitly
hold, that statistical evidence may establish a [p] rima facie case of employment dis-
crimination in an individual case." (quoting Davis, 613 F.2d at 962)).
57. The First Circuit has identified this issue without deciding it, acknowledging in a
footnote that "[w]hether in a non-class action, proof of a prima facie case different
from the [McDonnell Douglas] elements would require the defendant to do some-
thing other than produce a 'legitimate reason' is a matter we need not decide now."
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 6oo F.2d 1003, 1017 N-17 (1st Cir. 1979).
58. The Third Circuit heard a case involving a single African-American employee's
claim of a pattern or practice of racial discrimination, which though "at most[]
isolated or sporadic," did not fail due to the absence of a certified class. Berry v.
Jacobs IMC, LLC, 99 Fed. App'x 405, 410 (3d Cir. 2004).
59. E.g., Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. at Davis, No. CIV. 2-03-
02591, 2007 WL 3046034 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007).
60. Although the scope of the court's decision was limited to a finding that the district
court erred in refusing to allow statistical evidence to enter the record, the court
discussed Obrey's claims with extensive reference to the Teamsters opinion and
noted that Obrey had to demonstrate, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that
racial discrimination was the Navy's 'standard operating procedure-the regular
rather than the unusual practice."' 40o F.3d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
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III. A CASE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL PATTERN OR PRACTICE CLAIM
According to a majority of circuit courts, a cause of action against a pattern
or practice of discrimination is available only to the EEOC under section 707 or
to a certified private class under the Teamsters framework. But the reasoning put
forward is problematic in at least two respects. First, the narrow view of the
Teamsters framework conflicts with both the methodological flexibility advo-
cated by the early decisions of the Court and the well-established remedial pur-
pose of Title VII. Second, the circuit courts have failed to fully conceive of an
individual systemic disparate treatment claim as separate from an individual dis-
parate treatment claim. Allowing plaintiffs to pursue private non-class suits is
consistent with an approach that recognizes this critical distinction, focusing on
the source of harm rather than the number involved.
A. The Expansive Origins of Title VII
The rationale of the circuit courts for barring individual claims relies on an
unsubstantiated assumption: that the scope of the pattern or practice claim is
narrow and cannot be applied beyond the private class context without express
judicial or legislative approval. It is undisputed, of course, that neither the Su-
preme Court nor the statutory text has ever explicitly authorized the Teamsters
method of proof for the individual plaintiff. Yet neither have such claims ever
been explicitly foreclosed by those authorities. The problem with the courts' con-
clusion is the presumption that the original burden-shifting framework was in-
tended to apply narrowly. The courts have largely failed to provide a reasoned
justification for this narrow application.
As noted, the Second Circuit does attempt to offer a coherent theory for the
limited scope of the pattern or practice claim." However, the derivation narrative
offered by Chin is not entirely persuasive; ultimately, it too fails to provide a
sound rationale for the narrow construction it adopts. Though Franks involved a
class action, the Franks Court did not stipulate that its alternate method of proof
was unavailable to an individual plaintiff subject to systemic harm. Rather, the
Court stated that its decision was guided by the broader anti-discriminatory pur-
pose of Title VII. It emphasized that "the statutory scheme of Title VII implicitly
recognizes that there may be cases calling for one remedy but not another.""
Systemic discrimination may be one such case. Indeed, an equally plausible and
convincing interpretation of the adoption of Franks exists. 63 That is, it was the
61. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (describing the argument that Team-
sters originated in the class action context in Franks and was only later extended to
cover section 707 pattern or practice claims).
62. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976) (internal citations and quo-
tation marks omitted).
63. Recall that the critical holding in Franks (later adopted in Teamsters) provides that




difficulty and importance of rooting out systemic discrimination that led the
Teamsters Court to adopt an alternative framework for a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, a framework which itself emerged as an attempt to provide a more
plaintiff-friendly method of proof for establishing systemic disparate treatment.
Viewed in this context, these cases suggest that the Franks-Teamsters burden-
shifting framework emerged not because of a certain individual-class distinction,
but rather in response to new patterns and practices of system-wide discrimina-
tion.
Moreover, the narrow view of the pattern or practice claim appears at odds
with the original purpose of Title VII. In focusing on the foundations of the
claim, the Second Circuit appears to overlook the context in which those early
cases were decided. The Court, around the time it heard Franks, consistently em-
phasized the broad remedial purpose of Title VII. The Teamsters opinion in-
cluded the strong purposive language typical of the Court's jurisprudence at the
time, noting that "[tihe primary purpose of Title VII was 'to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disad-
vantage of minority citizens."' 64 Furthermore, the Court did not believe then that
McDonnell Douglas was the only method of proof (or even a strict method of
proof) available for establishing a prima facie case of individual disparate treat-
ment. In fact, Teamsters noted that the "importance of McDonnell Douglas lies,
not in its specification of the discrete elements of proof," but rather "in its recog-
nition of the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial
burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act."65 Both the
purpose of Title VII and the Court's rationale for offering alternative methods of
proof to McDonnell Douglas weigh against a narrow construction of the pattern
or practice claim.
and practice" through the use of statistical evidence, the burden shifts "to the em-
ployer 'to prove that individuals who reapply were not in fact victims of previous
hiring discrimination."' Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 772).
64. Id. at 348 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); see
Leonard v. St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (In re Majewski), 310 F.3d 653, 660 (9th Cir.
2002) ("[Tlhis circuit and most of the other circuits have consistently construed
the anti-discriminatory provisions of [various] remedial statutes broadly."); Sam-
uel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 859-60 (2003) (arguing that the goal of
Title VII is not just to eradicate formal bias but also to promote full inclusion).
65. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.
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B. Identifying the Source ofHarm
Another concern of the circuit courts is that a non-class Teamsters claim
would allow a plaintiff to circumvent the requirements of a prima facie case un-
der McDonnell Douglas,66 resulting in doctrinal inconsistencies for individual
claimants.6" Traditionally, courts have evaluated individual claims involving spe-
cific instances of harm-such as being fired or overlooked for a promotion-
under McDonnell Douglas. Only where a class is certified have courts allowed
broad patterns of discrimination to substantiate a prima facie case with statistical
evidence under Teamsters.
But this construction of the doctrine admits of a failure by the circuit courts
to conceptualize the difference between harm to an individual based on particu-
lar instances of discrimination and harm to an individual based on a broad pat-
tern of discrimination. I refer to this distinction-individual disparate treatment
versus individual systemic disparate treatment-as the source of harm. An indi-
vidual experiences discrimination in either situation, though the current law of
pattern or practice fails to cognize the latter category of harm. By focusing on the
source of harm, we find two forms of discrimination giving rise to two separate
frameworks-individual McDonnell Douglas claims and individual Teamsters
claims-with doctrinal requirements specific to each.
This approach is consistent with other forms of antidiscrimination. In cases
of individual disparate treatment and disparate impact, the courts appear to de-
termine the best method of proof by considering the cause of the injury. For ex-
ample, a single employee rejected from a job or promotion based on a protected
characteristic experiences an individualized instance of harm. The claim is re-
viewed under the McDonnell Douglas standard, which was designed to uncover
discriminatory intent hidden in specific individual determinations. On the other
hand, if an employer introduced a test used in the hiring process that produced
a significant racial or gender disparity, an employee would experience a system-
wide harm. The resulting disparate impact claim would challenge the test
through the use of aggregated data-statistical analysis of the relevant employee
pool revealing a broad policy-based skew. Interestingly, disparate impact claims
can be brought by an individual or a plaintiff class.6"
66. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4 th Cir. 1998) (citing McDon-
nell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
67. Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
68. Without directly addressing the issue, the Supreme Court has ruled on other
grounds in two separate disparate impact cases brought by individual plaintiffs.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982). Several appellate courts have also noted the availability of disparate
impact claims for individual plaintiffs. E.g., Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 79
F.3d 661, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d loo, 1016 (1st
Cir. 1984); Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451 (ioth Cir. 1981).
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For private actions alleging a discriminatory pattern or practice, however,
the courts deviate from this approach. Rather than looking first to the site or
source of harm to determine the appropriate method of proof, courts begin in-
stead by considering the number and composition of those injured. Under this
approach, how a court conceives of the underlying harm caused by a pattern or
practice of discrimination-and thus the requirements of a prima facie case-
varies depending on whether a similar allegation of discrimination is brought by
an individual or a class. In foreclosing the individual pattern or practice claim,
courts have adopted an approach that is at odds with the treatment of antidis-
crimination claims in other contexts and that cannot be justified.
One possible response of opponents to the individual pattern or practice suit
suggests itself: that class certification warrants the departure from the strict
McDonnell Douglas factors by providing additional evidentiary value. It could be,
for instance, that certifying a class provides information, evidence, and anecdotal
accounts of harm that would otherwise be required by McDonnell Douglas. Yet
there is no indication, at any level of review, that the process of certification in
Franks helped serve some evidentiary need. Further, class certification, which was
designed for a specific purpose, is at best an imperfect tool for obtaining reliable
evidence of discrimination. There appears to be little reason, then, to entangle
the requirements of class certification with those of a prima facie case of discrim-
ination.
CONCLUSION
Both McDonnell Douglas and Teamsters reflect an awareness of the difficul-
ties involved in identifying and rooting out discrimination in the workplace.
Over time, the methods of proof created by these early cases, which never sug-
gested they were to be inflexibly applied, have become calcified.'9 As a result, cir-
cuit courts have refused to allow non-class pattern or practice claims, even as
plaintiffs continue to struggle to bring successful challenges against potentially
discriminatory employment actions.
The pattern or practice claim is a relevant and effective method for address-
ing the increasingly subtle or unconscious forms of discrimination today. Even
viewed in the most favorable light, the most convincing rationales for precluding
individual claims cannot be sustained. They demonstrate a misconstruction of
the pattern or practice framework: both in the understanding of the original
scope of the claim and in how it locates the source of harm within a discrimina-
tion suit. For Title VII to remain relevant to the purposes for which it was
adopted, individual pattern or practice suits should be allowed and encouraged.
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69. See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, no MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011).

